Evans & Novak on the Brown campaign's racial calculus in 1966

As the strength of the Reagan candidacy and the power of the anti-Brown vote became more and more apparent, California Democrats were frantically scrambling for some way to preserve a third administration for the incumbent governor.  Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, reported in July '66 on some of the political brainstorming to save Brown:

As one small attempt to hold down the social temperature in the Negro ghetto of Watts this summer, several prominent Los Angeles citizens arranged for feature movies to be shown at a nominal admission price in school buildings to compensate for the absence of commercial theaters in Watts...This project might help prevent renewed Negro rioting, and its sponsors have a special reason for wanting Watts cool and calm this summer.  As backers of Democratic Gov. Edmund G. (Pat) Brown’s uphill bid for a third term, they know that more racial conflict will propel Republican Ronald Reagan into the Governor’s chair on white backlash...But Brown was not on hand for the opening of the makeshift movie theater.  Nor, indeed, was he in any way publicly connected with the project his supporters had conceived.  For to be publicly sympathetic to the Negroes of Watts is suicide in the backlash politics of California today...Noting Yorty’s awesome vote against him in the primary election among blue collar whites, Brown felt compelled to support the anti-riot bill.  Anything less would be conceding defeat to Reagan.(Evans, R. & Novak, R. (1966, July 18). Watts' problems in cement for Brown-Reagan battle.)

So discount movies were seen as a way to "buy off" the black community, which (it seems) was otherwise presumed to be on the verge of rioting.  Worse still, according to Evans and Novak, Brown's primary concern was not so much for the justice or injustice in the black community (else, why didn't he show up for the grand opening) as it was for his own re-election efforts.  

And yet the narrative for decades has been that Republicans are stereotyping racial minorities?  Republicans are the ones accused of trying to "buy off" minority votes?  Republicans are the ones said to have no core convictions about right and wrong?  Republicans are the ones seeking to "use" people for political advantage?

No one "has" to unite behind a GOP candidate until November

In light of the recent calls to "unite behind a candidate" (i.e., unite behind Romney) I thought it might be timely to remind Republican primary voters of a little conservative movement history.  It wasn't until after the "too-conservative-to-win-a-general-election" Ronald Reagan defeated GOP moderate George Christopher in the summer of 1966 that real unity emerged amongst the California GOP.   In fact, for the first time since Earl Warren (a gap of a quarter century) the GOP nominees decided to run as a unified ticket led by Reagan, rather than running on the "every-candidate-for-himself" model.(The truce of Reagan)

The reason I point this out is to suggest that Republican primary voters nationally are just as savvy in 2012 as California's GOP voters were in 1966 when the dynamic political reporting duo of Evans and Novak observed:  "[GOP candidates and voters] know their only chance of success in a state where a divided, declining Democratic party still remains the majority party is a Reagan landslide victory…” (The truce of Reagan)

On the off-chance that the electoral angst being experienced by Jeb Bush and others is sincere, let me reassure the governor that the vast majority (if not all) of us conservative and libertarian voters are well aware of the risks.  We recognize (notwithstanding the ill-advised comments of Sen. Santorum) that Romney is faaaar preferable to a second Obama term.  However, we also recognize that there is absolutely no reason that "we need to get the primary over with."  On the contrary, many of us believe that even if our preferred candidate cannot win the nomination, carrying on the fight and making the Romney forces "sweat it out" holds the possibility of forcing some much-needed concessions from the camp of the Inevitable One.

Furthermore, I would encourage each GOP candidate's camp to realize that we in the grassroots are finished carrying the water for "our President, right or wrong."  Any Republican president who is tempted to go off the reservation by embracing Big Government, uber-regulation, or the rolling back of individual liberties can expect just as much protest and activism against him, as President Obama has received. 

It's probably best if all Republican voters go into this November recognizing the blunt truth that Evans and Novak saw so clearly nearly 50 years ago:

What is called unity is really a truce dictated by Reagan’s landslide primary win over moderate George Christopher. ‘If Reagan had won by 50,000 or 60,000 votes, we’d be scratching each other’s eyes out,’ one prominent liberal Republican here told us. ‘But with the size of his win, we have no choice but to accept him. That still doesn’t mean we buy his ideology or him.’ (The truce of Reagan)

News Archive: Kuchel stays potent force even out of governor’s race.

Evans, R.and Novak, R. (1965, September 28). Kuchel stays potent force even out of governor’s race. Lawrence Journal-World, p.4.

In late September 1965, Evans and Novak reported on rumors that though Tom Kuchel had ruled out a gubernatorial bid, the powerful CA senator was being entreated to play the kingmaker role, by publicly backing one of the moderate-liberal Republicans in the GOP primary in order to prevent Ronald Reagan from securing the nomination.  Given the fractured state of the CA GOP liberals, however, the authors acknowledge that even with Kuchel backing, there would have been “no certainty [of beating] Reagan.”  

The authors reported that the Reagan camp’s only real concern was long-time Nixon assistant and then-candidate for Lieutenant Governor, Robert Finch.  The fear—according to Evans and Novak—was that in the event of a divided and bruising primary, Nixon forces would push for Finch at the last minute as a compromise candidate.  However, since “Finch’s candidacy would be interpreted as a Nixon operation…[and]…Finch could not beat Reagan if billed as a Nixon front, a late Finch-for-Governor drive [was deemed] remote.”

The reporters’ rather pessimistic conclusion was that:

All this is reminiscent of 1963 and 1964 when moderate Republicans never united in one battle plan to stop Barry Goldwater for President.  On a state level here, the moderates are in exactly the same sorry condition and will stay there unless Kuchel tries to assume the uncharacteristic role of peacemaker.  That at least provides a ray of hope that was wholly lacking at last weekend’s San Francisco convention.